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hunt-lateral-movement

@dandye · 收录于 5 天前 · 上游提交 3 个月前

Hunt for lateral movement using PsExec, WMI, or similar techniques. Use when proactively searching for attackers moving through your network using admin tools. Searches for service installations, remote process execution, and suspicious network correlations.

适合你,如果你需要主动发现攻击者在内网中的横向移动行为。

/ 通过 npx 安装 校验哈希
npx oh-my-skill add dandye/ai-runbooks/hunt-lateral-movement
/ 通过 bash 安装
curl -fsSL https://oh-my-skill.com/install.sh | bash -s -- dandye/ai-runbooks/hunt-lateral-movement
/ 已经装过?验证本机副本,不用重装
npx oh-my-skill verify dandye/ai-runbooks/hunt-lateral-movement
安装目标可用 --agent / --scope 或 --to 明确指定;省略时只会在唯一已存在的 agent 目录上自动选择,零命中或多命中会停止并提示。content_hash 缺失或不一致均拒装。
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怎么用

商店整理自技能原文 · 版本 086cbf6 · 表述以原文为准
它做什么

装上后,Claude会主动搜索网络日志中由PsExec或WMI等工具留下的横向移动痕迹,包括服务安装事件、远程进程创建和可疑SMB连接,并分析结果找出异常行为。

什么时候触发

当用户要求主动搜索横向移动迹象,或指定使用PsExec、WMI等攻击技术进行威胁猎杀时触发。

装好后可以这样说
Claude将检索服务安装和进程创建日志。
会搜索WmiPrvSE.exe作为父进程的启动。
技能原文 SKILL.md作者撰写 · Apache-2.0 · 086cbf6

Lateral Movement Hunt Skill (PsExec/WMI)

Proactively hunt for signs of lateral movement using common administrative tools like PsExec or WMI abuse.

Inputs
  • TIME_FRAME_HOURS - Lookback period (default: 72)
  • (Optional) TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY - UDM query to narrow scope
  • (Optional) HUNT_HYPOTHESIS - Reason for the hunt
  • (Optional) HUNT_CASE_ID - SOAR case for tracking
Workflow
Step 1: Research Techniques
secops-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1021.002 SMB Admin Shares")
secops-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1047 WMI")
secops-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer")
Step 2: Develop Hunt Queries
Query Placeholders

The queries below use placeholders that must be customized for your environment:

| Placeholder | Type | Description | |-------------|------|-------------| | known_services | Reference List | Legitimate services spawned by services.exe. Define this list in Chronicle and populate with your environment baseline. | | TARGET_IP | IP Address | Replace with the target system IP from your investigation context. | | SOURCE_IP | IP Address | Replace with the source system IP from your investigation context. |

PsExec Service Installation:

metadata.product_event_type = "ServiceInstalled" AND
target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "PSEXESVC.exe"

PsExec Execution (services.exe spawning unusual processes):

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" AND
target.process.file.full_path NOT IN @known_services  // Replace with your Chronicle reference list

WMI Process Creation:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe" AND
target.process.file.full_path IN ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")

WMI Remote Execution:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "wmic" AND
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "/node:" AND
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "process call create"

PowerShell WMI Methods:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "powershell.exe" AND
(target.process.command_line CONTAINS "Invoke-WmiMethod" OR
 target.process.command_line CONTAINS "Invoke-CimMethod")

Combine with TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY if provided.

Step 3: Execute SIEM Searches
secops-mcp.search_security_events(text=query, hours_back=TIME_FRAME_HOURS)

Run each developed query.

Step 4: Network Correlation

If suspicious process activity found, correlate with network:

metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION" AND
target.port = 445 AND
target.ip = "TARGET_IP" AND      // Replace with actual target IP from findings
principal.ip = "SOURCE_IP"       // Replace with actual source IP from findings

Look for SMB connections temporally correlated with remote execution.

Step 5: Analyze Results

Look for anomalous patterns:

  • PsExec/WMI from unexpected sources (user workstations vs. admin servers)
  • Execution targeting many hosts rapidly
  • Suspicious commands executed via WMI
  • Temporal correlation between network connections and remote process execution
Step 6: Enrich Findings

If suspicious activity found:

For each suspicious entity (host, user):

secops-mcp.lookup_entity(entity_value=ENTITY)

For any discovered IOCs: Use /enrich-ioc

Step 7: Check Related Cases

Use /find-relevant-case with suspicious entities.

Step 8: Document & Conclude

Use /document-in-case:

  • Hunt hypothesis
  • Techniques hunted (T1021.002, T1047, etc.)
  • Queries used (with results)
  • Negative results explicitly noted
  • Suspicious findings with enrichment
  • Suggested follow-on actions

If lateral movement confirmed: → Trigger case_event_timeline_and_process_analysis for affected processes → Trigger compromised_user_account_response for involved users → Escalate to incident response

Required Outputs

After completing this skill, you MUST report these outputs:

| Output | Description | |--------|-------------| | FINDINGS | Detected lateral movement activity (events, processes, connections) | | DETECTED_TECHNIQUES | MITRE techniques observed (e.g., T1021.002, T1047) | | AFFECTED_HOSTS | Hosts involved in lateral movement (source and target systems) |

Key Indicators

| Technique | Indicator | Query Focus | |-----------|-----------|-------------| | PsExec | PSEXESVC.exe service | Service installation events | | PsExec | services.exe spawning | Process parent-child | | WMI | WmiPrvSE.exe spawning | Process parent-child | | WMI | wmic /node: | Command line | | General | SMB port 445 | Network connections |

按 Apache-2.0 许可原样转载,未经改动 · 在 GitHub 查看 →

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