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respond-ransomware

@dandye · 收录于 5 天前 · 上游提交 3 个月前

Respond to a ransomware incident following PICERL methodology. Use when ransomware is detected or suspected. Orchestrates identification, containment, eradication, and recovery phases. Requires CASE_ID and initial indicators.

适合你,如果负责企业安全事件响应,需要标准化勒索软件处置流程。

/ 通过 npx 安装 校验哈希
npx oh-my-skill add dandye/ai-runbooks/respond-ransomware
/ 通过 bash 安装
curl -fsSL https://oh-my-skill.com/install.sh | bash -s -- dandye/ai-runbooks/respond-ransomware
/ 已经装过?验证本机副本,不用重装
npx oh-my-skill verify dandye/ai-runbooks/respond-ransomware
安装目标可用 --agent / --scope 或 --to 明确指定;省略时只会在唯一已存在的 agent 目录上自动选择,零命中或多命中会停止并提示。content_hash 缺失或不一致均拒装。
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怎么用

商店整理自技能原文 · 版本 086cbf6 · 表述以原文为准
它做什么

装上后,Claude 会按照 PICERL 方法(识别、遏制、清除、恢复)响应勒索软件事件。你需要提供案件 ID 和初始指标(如受影响端点、文件哈希),Claude 会逐步执行各阶段并输出报告。

什么时候触发

当你怀疑或确认发生勒索软件事件时触发。需提供 CASE_ID 和初始指标(如受影响端点、文件哈希等)。

装好后可以这样说
Claude 会识别勒索软件变种并遏制。
Claude 会请求确认后执行遏制操作。
技能原文 SKILL.md作者撰写 · Apache-2.0 · 086cbf6

Ransomware Incident Response Skill

Structured workflow for responding to suspected ransomware incidents using the PICERL model.

Inputs
  • CASE_ID - SOAR case ID for the incident
  • ALERT_GROUP_IDENTIFIERS - Alert group identifiers from SOAR
  • INITIAL_INDICATORS - Initial detection info:
  • Affected endpoint(s)
  • File hashes observed
  • Ransom note details (handle carefully)
  • Suspicious network connections
Required Outputs

After completing each phase, you MUST report these outputs:

Identification Phase

| Output | Description | |--------|-------------| | AFFECTED_SYSTEMS | Systems confirmed infected with ransomware | | RANSOMWARE_VARIANT | Ransomware family/variant identified | | ENCRYPTION_STATUS | Current encryption state of affected systems | | RANSOMWARE_IOCS | File hashes, ransom note patterns, malicious files |

Containment Phase

| Output | Description | |--------|-------------| | ISOLATED_SYSTEMS | Systems successfully isolated from network | | BLOCKED_IOCS | IOCs blocked at firewall/proxy | | C2_INDICATORS | C2 domains/IPs discovered during containment |

Eradication Phase

| Output | Description | |--------|-------------| | CLEANED_SYSTEMS | Systems with malware/persistence removed | | REMOVED_PERSISTENCE | Persistence mechanisms identified and removed |

Recovery Phase

| Output | Description | |--------|-------------| | RESTORED_SYSTEMS | Systems restored to operational state | | VALIDATION_STATUS | Post-recovery validation results |

PICERL Phases
Phase 1: Preparation (Ongoing)

Prerequisites - verify before proceeding:

  • Tool connectivity (SIEM, SOAR, GTI, EDR)
  • Backup availability and status
  • Communication/escalation plans

Phase 2: Identification

Step 2.1: Get Context

secops-soar.get_case_full_details(case_id=CASE_ID)

Use /check-duplicates to verify this isn't already under investigation.

Step 2.2: Identify Ransomware Strain

If file hash available:

gti-mcp.get_file_report(hash=FILE_HASH)

If name/family known:

gti-mcp.search_threats(query="LockBit ransomware", collection_type="malware-family")

Document: IDENTIFIED_STRAIN

Step 2.3: Investigate Initial Access & Lateral Movement

Search SIEM for activity BEFORE encryption:

secops-mcp.search_security_events(
    text="Suspicious logins, RDP, exploit attempts for affected endpoints",
    hours_back=168
)

Look for:

  • Suspicious logins to affected endpoints
  • Lateral movement tools (PsExec, Cobalt Strike)
  • Credential dumping activity
  • Network connections from affected endpoints

Identify: INITIAL_ACCESS_VECTOR, POTENTIAL_ADDITIONAL_SYSTEMS

Step 2.4: Initial Scope Assessment

Compile:

  • AFFECTED_ENDPOINTS - Confirmed infected systems
  • MALICIOUS_IOCs - Network IOCs (C2 domains/IPs)

Step 2.5: Check Related Cases

Use /find-relevant-case with affected entities.

Step 2.6: Document

Use /document-in-case with identification findings.


Phase 3: Containment

CRITICAL: Speed is essential. Contain first, investigate deeper later.

Step 3.1: Isolate Affected Endpoints

For each endpoint in AFFECTED_ENDPOINTS and POTENTIAL_ADDITIONAL_SYSTEMS:

Use /confirm-action:

"Isolate endpoint [HOSTNAME] from network?"

If confirmed, trigger endpoint isolation (via EDR or network).

Step 3.2: Block Network IOCs

For each IOC in MALICIOUS_IOCs:

Use /confirm-action:

"Block IOC [VALUE] at firewall/proxy?"

If confirmed, implement blocks.

Step 3.3: Contain User Accounts

If compromised user identified: → Trigger /respond-compromised-account

Step 3.4: Verify Containment

Monitor SIEM for continued activity:

secops-mcp.search_security_events(
    text="Activity from contained systems or IOCs",
    hours_back=1
)

Use /document-in-case with containment status.


Phase 4: Eradication

Step 4.1: Identify Persistence

Review GTI reports for known persistence TTPs of IDENTIFIED_STRAIN.

Common mechanisms:

  • Scheduled tasks
  • Services
  • Registry run keys
  • WMI subscriptions

Step 4.2: Remove Malware & Persistence

(Requires EDR/endpoint tools)

  • Remove ransomware executables
  • Delete persistence mechanisms
  • Note: Re-imaging often preferred over cleaning

Step 4.3: Scan Systems

Perform thorough AV/EDR scans on affected systems.

Use /document-in-case with eradication actions.


Phase 5: Recovery

Step 5.1: Check Decryptor Availability

Based on IDENTIFIED_STRAIN, check:

  • NoMoreRansom.org
  • Security vendor decryptor tools

Step 5.2: Determine Recovery Strategy

Options:

  1. Restore from clean backups (most common)
  2. Use decryptor if available
  3. Rebuild systems from scratch

Step 5.3: Execute Recovery

(Involves IT Ops/System Admins)

  • Rebuild/restore systems
  • Verify backup integrity before restore
  • Patch and harden before reconnecting
  • Restore data from clean backups

Step 5.4: Monitor & Lift Containment

  • Monitor recovered systems closely
  • Gradually remove isolation measures
  • Watch for signs of residual infection

Use /document-in-case with recovery status.


Phase 6: Lessons Learned

Use /generate-report with comprehensive incident report.

Conduct post-incident review:

  • Initial access vector analysis
  • Detection timeline review
  • Response effectiveness
  • Recovery success
  • Recommendations for prevention

Critical Warnings
  • DO NOT delay containment to perform deep analysis
  • DO NOT restore without verifying backups/cleaning
  • DO check for lateral movement before closing
  • ALWAYS confirm isolation actions with analyst
Quick Reference

| Phase | Key Actions | Skills Used | |-------|-------------|-------------| | Identification | Strain ID, scope | /check-duplicates, /find-relevant-case | | Containment | Isolate, block | /confirm-action, /document-in-case | | Eradication | Remove persistence | EDR tools | | Recovery | Restore systems | IT Ops coordination | | Lessons Learned | Report, review | /generate-report |

按 Apache-2.0 许可原样转载,未经改动 · 在 GitHub 查看 →

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